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Social Insecurity: A Modest 
Proposal for Remedying Federal 
District Court Inconsistency in 
Social Security Cases 
 




Since its inception in 1935, Social Security has become an 
enormously important institution in American life.1 Millions 
rely on its resources,2 and the number is rapidly growing.3 It is 
also an enormously troubled program,4 and its problems are on 
the rise as well.5 
 
* BA with Honors, 2006, Swarthmore College. JD Cum Laude, Order of 
the Coif, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law. The views expressed 
herein are solely those of the author and any kindred spirits. He can be 
contacted regarding the Article at j-horwitz2010@nlaw.northwestern.edu. 
† Sincere thanks to Brandie Morgenroth for her always-impeccable 
editing, Irene Plagianos for facilitating the Article’s incubation process, Matt 
Fernholz for steadfast moral and citational support, Lauren Chiang for 
lending her formatting brilliance, and, last and most certainly least, Charles 
Wolfinger for modest and grudging research assistance. Any errors are 
attributable to the author and the author alone. 
1. See, e.g., Nancy J. Altman, Social Security and the Low-Income 
Worker, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1161 (2007) (“Social Security is important to 
all Americans . . . .”). 
2. See Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income 
Security System and the Principles and Values It Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 5, 9 (2011) (calculating that “about fifty-three million people were 
receiving Social Security benefits at the end of 2009”). 
3. See Number of Social Security Beneficiaries, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/icpGraph.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) 
(indicating that the number of Social Security beneficiaries has grown from 
just over 25 million in 1970 to just over 55 million in 2012). 
4. See, e.g., Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer 
Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1939 (2011) (noting the “long, troubled history” of 
Social Security and other benefits programs). 
5. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Stress Rises on Social Security, WALL ST. J. 
1
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This Article addresses a relatively narrow but 
consequential problem in the system: the inadequacy of federal 
judicial resolution of appeals from the denial of Social Security 
disability benefits. It addresses the problem with an equally 
narrow, and hopefully equally consequential, solution: granting 
a published district court decision in such a case the power of 
binding precedent6 with respect to the judicial district in which 
the opinion is issued. In so doing, greater uniformity, 
consistency, fairness, and efficiency would be brought to a 
process that is badly in need of all.7 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides some 
brief background on binding precedent in the court system 
generally. With that background in mind, Part II surveys the 
Social Security disability process, summarizing its basic 
structure. Part III then transitions into a discussion of the 
federal courts’ role in the process, focusing on the problems 
afflicting their decisions: inconsistency, lack of appellate 
guidance, unfairness, unpredictability, and inefficiency. To 
solve those problems, Part IV proposes imbuing all published 
federal district court opinions in Social Security appeals with 
the force of binding law with respect to all other judges in the 
district. Finally, Part V applies the proposal, demonstrating 
how this reform would help deal with each of the flaws in the 
process. 
 
I. Background on Binding Precedent 
 
In order to understand the merits of the proposal, one 
 
(Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303592404577362052094040
414.html. 
6. For the sake of convenience, binding precedent will henceforth 
occasionally be referred to simply as “precedent,” or “case law.” It should be 
remembered that other commentators and courts sometimes use the term 
“precedent” more broadly to refer to any judicial decision, or any judicial 
decision that might possess persuasive value. See generally Jeffrey C. 
Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2010) (using 
“precedent” in this way). 
7. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches 
to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 
754-55 (2003) (remarking on a perception of a “problem of inconsistent 
application of the law” in the Social Security disability system). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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must first understand the status quo, both in terms of Social 
Security disability appeals in the federal courts and in terms of 
how and why certain federal judicial decisions acquire the 
power of binding precedent while others do not. We begin with 
the latter. 
Beginning with the basics, and running the risk of stating 
the obvious, opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court are binding 
on all of the inferior federal courts.8 Published opinions by 
three-judge panels of the federal circuit courts are binding on 
the district courts within the circuit9 and, generally, on other 
panels of the circuit.10 By contrast, district court opinions, 
whether published or unpublished, have no precedential power; 
they bind only the parties to the litigation.11 
Historically, several rationales have been cited to justify 
the distinction between trial and appellate courts and their 
power to produce binding case law. For one thing, appellate 
courts tend to make decisions in multi-judge panels, thus 
ideally encouraging a more balanced, thoughtful, and correct 
final product than a single trial court judge might generate,12 
 
8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 
1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has 
appellate jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or federal 
proceedings, and by reason of the supremacy clause the decisions of that 
court . . . have binding effect on all lower courts whether state or federal.”). 
9. See, e.g., Yong v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 208 F.3d 1116, 
1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a federal circuit court issues a decision, the 
district courts within that circuit are bound to follow it . . . .”) (citation 
omitted). 
10. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 
1179-80 (2006) (remarking that “all circuit courts provide that the decision of 
a panel is binding on every other panel, unless the decision is overturned en 
banc or by later Supreme Court action”) (footnote omitted). Slightly 
modifying the general rule, the Second and Seventh Circuits have procedures 
whereby one three-judge panel circulates a draft opinion overruling precedent 
from another to seek the approval of the court for the overruling. See, e.g., 
Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 
NEV. L.J. 787, 798 & n.83 (2012). 
11. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (“A 
decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a 
different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same 
judge in a different case.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
12. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177 
(1921) (“The eccentricities of judges balance one another.”); Stephanos Bibas, 
Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics at Sentencing, 
3
  
2014] SOCIAL INSECURITY 33 
or at the very least projecting to the public the message that 
the opinion has such qualities.13 Similarly, because most losing 
parties in the trial courts do not pursue appeals,14 and because 
appellate proceedings are typically regarded as less urgent 
than trial proceedings,15 courts of appeals are thought to enjoy 
the peace and quiet necessary to ably direct the development of 
the law. In the same vein, appellate judges decide cases on the 
basis of paper records, formal briefs, and rigidly structured oral 
arguments, as opposed to the frequently chaotic and far more 
human and dynamic proceedings that trial judges must 
supervise.16 Under the conventional wisdom, that formality and 
rigidity nurture a more scholarly comprehension of the law and 
its evolution, distanced from the more blinkered worm’s eye 
view of the trial judge.17 Furthermore, some have said that 
 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1383 (2009) (“Three-judge panels will be less likely 
to reflect extreme views than a single judge.”); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded 
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and 
the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 552 (1969); Jonathan Remy Nash & 
Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the 
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2008). 
13. Cf. Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal 
Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433, 483 (2011) (“[T]he more judges that sign on to 
an opinion, the more likely court-watchers and the public will view it as the 
correct result.”) (footnote omitted). 
14. See Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to 
Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1445, 1446 (2012) (referencing the fact that only approximately 15% of 
cases are appealed from the district courts to the circuit courts) (footnote 
omitted). 
15. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1074 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (“This case reflects the difficulty of the time pressures of a trial 
judge who, because of the tide of events that could not be stopped, had to 
decide many of the critical policy and constitutional questions within 
minutes. We as an appellate court, on the other hand, have had the benefit of 
less urgent time constrains as well as the benefit of the work product of 
counsel on appeal who within this more relaxed time frame were able to 
thoughtfully research the issues, prepare briefs and articulate theories far 
more precisely than those presented to the trial court.”). 
16. See, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and 
Madness in the Supreme Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 
U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 334 (2002) (acknowledging that appellate courts are 
divorced “from the dynamic setting of the trial courtroom, and 
restricted . . . to the paper record”). 
17. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 
1479 n.211 (2010) (stating that a court of appeals “is in a different position 
because it must take a bird’s-eye view with regard to questions of law”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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appellate courts, by definition more prestigious than the courts 
they sit over, will tend to attract judges with the intellects and 
temperaments necessary to preside over the growth of the 
common law, whereas trial courts may not.18 Finally, and 
perhaps implicit in all of the above, there is a more conceptual 
argument to be made that the creation of a tiered system in 
which higher courts craft precedent while lower courts do not is 
automatically preferable because it injects a dignity and a 
gravitas to the development of the common law by elevating it 
above the mundane vicissitudes and day-to-day theatrics of the 
trial courts.19 
 
II. The Social Security Disability Claims Process 
 
On top of this background description of how the federal 
judiciary delegates the power to write precedential opinions 
one must template the basic process of the Social Security 
disability benefits system. 
This Article is concerned with two Social Security 
programs: disability insurance benefits and supplemental 
security income.20 With numerous nuances and qualifications 
not pertinent here, both programs disperse government funds 
to individuals suffering from impairments that prevent them 
from holding gainful employment.21 In the interest of clarity, 
money distributed to individuals under either program will 
 
18. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on 
Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by 
Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
351, 379 (1995) (“District judges are perceived by some to have lower status 
or prestige than circuit judges and typically will have less acumen regarding 
appellate practice.”) (footnote omitted). 
19. See Nash & Pardo, supra note 12, at 1749-50. Although one 
commentator has interestingly argued that the distinction arose in part as 
the result of a historical accident, whereby appellate court decisions were 
published while trial courts’ were not. See Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring 
Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, 53 VILL. L. REV. 
1, 34 (2008). 
20. The other major elements of the Social Security budget are the 
retirement and survivors’ programs. See generally Budget Estimates and 
Related Information, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/budget/ (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2012). Those programs are outside the scope of this Article. 
21. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003). 
5
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henceforth be referred to as “benefits,” and appeals under both 
programs will occasionally be referred to as “disability” cases. 
Briefly, the process begins when an individual files a claim 
with the Social Security Administration for benefits.22 After 
various screening mechanisms and examinations are employed, 
none of which are relevant to this Article,23 an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ), an official employed by the Social Security 
Administration and thus working for the executive branch, 
renders a decision on the claim, accompanied by a written 
explanation of her reasoning.24 If the ALJ denies benefits, the 
claimant can appeal her decision to the Social Security Appeals 
Council, which has the discretion to select the claims it hears.25 
If the Appeals Council either declines to hear the claim or 
affirms the ALJ’s denial of benefits, the claimant26 has the 
right to appeal to a federal district court.27 
The district court has to answer two questions with respect 
to every such appeal: 1) whether the ALJ’s decision was 
supported by “substantial evidence”; and 2) whether it 
comported with the relevant legal standards.28 In answering 
both questions, the district court is obliged to show 
considerable deference to the ALJ.29 It cannot re-weigh the 
evidence or substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s, and factual 
conflicts in the record must be resolved by the ALJ, not the 
 
22. See SSA Federal Old—Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance, 20 
C.F.R. § 404.610 (2004); SSA Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, 
Blind, and Disabled, 20 C.F.R. § 416.310 (1994). As with plaintiffs, the 
defendant in a Social Security appeal is referred to by different terms 
depending on the author, including “government,” “Social Security 
Administration,” “SSA,” “Administration,” and so on. For variety, this Article 
will use the nomenclature interchangeably. 
23. See HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND 
PROCEDURES §§ 1:2, 1:8 (West Group 5th ed. 1998), for an overview of that 
process. 
24. SSA Federal Old—Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance, 20 
C.F.R. § 404.953 (2010). 
25. SSA Federal Old—Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance, 20 
C.F.R. § 404.967. 
26. Courts and commentators give plaintiffs different labels, most often 
simply “plaintiff” or “claimant.” For variety, this Article will use both 
interchangeably. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010). 
28. Id. 
29. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26-27 (2003). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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court.30 If the district court determines either that the ALJ’s 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, or that it was inconsistent with the controlling legal 
standards (and that the error was not harmless31), the court 
can remand the claim for further administrative proceedings, 
such as a rehearing, or simply order the Social Security 
Administration to calculate and award benefits.32 After the 
district court decision is handed down, either party can appeal 
to the circuit court33 and, after that tribunal issues a decision, 
to the Supreme Court.34 
 
III. Judicial Problems with Social Security Cases 
 
To properly evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 
the proposal articulated here, one must understand the ills it is 




There are different ways of ranking the severity of the 
various defects in the judicial oversight of Social Security 
disability programs, as there are of ranking the defects in any 
system. Some, for example, might see the most important 
objective to be that deserving individuals receive benefits, and 
thus might be more willing to overlook flaws that direct some 
taxpayer money to individuals unqualified for such benefits, so 
long as the rightful recipients get their share as well. 
Analogizing Blackstone’s famous adage that it is “better that 
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”35 to 
this context, one might say that it is better that ten 
 
30. See, e.g., Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002). 
31. See, e.g., Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). 
32. Id. 
33. See John J. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical 
Decision-Making: A Study of Social Security’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines-
-Two Birds with One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329, 
335 (1983). 
34. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (deciding a case that 
arose through the process described above). 
35. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
7
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undeserving claimants receive unwarranted benefits, than that 
one truly disabled individual be denied them. 
Nevertheless, in the view of the author, inconsistency, even 
if it can, at times, lead to greater generosity, is the most serious 
problem plaguing the system, the one most responsible for the 
other flaws, and the one most directly remedied by the 
proposal. So wherein lies the inconsistency? 
It lies, quite simply, in the radically different odds of the 
claimant’s success depending on which district judge is 
presiding over a given claim. It is important to note at the 
outset the distinction between what type of inconsistency is 
being addressed here, and what type is not. The inconsistency 
between judicial districts has been noted elsewhere,36 and is no 
doubt an important issue for reformers to consider. However, it 
is not the issue under consideration here, because it would not 
be ameliorated by the proposal being advanced. If a district 
court decision has precedential weight in that judicial district, 
as this Article advocates, there would still be room for 
inconsistency across different districts, because the district 
court opinion would still not bind other districts.37 The only 
remedy for that would be to accord precedential weight to every 
district court decision in every district. Such a regime would fly 
in the face of the entire federal judicial structure; indeed, it 
would destroy the very purpose of having judicial districts in 
the first place.38 
The species of inconsistency at issue here, then, is between 
judges within judicial districts. That inconsistency has been 
recognized in other legal contexts,39 but not in the context of 
Social Security appeals. It is a serious concern nonetheless. But 
does such inconsistency exist? As shown below, it unfortunately 
does. 
 
36. See, e.g., Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 7, at 754-55. 
37. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (“A 
decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in . . . a 
different judicial district . . . .”) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
38. See generally Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board: Re-
Examining Accepted Premises of Regional Circuit Structure, 12 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 201 (2011). 
39. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 10, at 813-14 (examining the problem of 
“judge-shopping” within federal judicial districts). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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1. The Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology is simple and straightforward. A 
Westlaw search for the phrase “Social Security” was conducted 
for each district court judge40 in the country, active or senior. 
Within those results, only cases listing a Commissioner of the 
Social Security Administration or a Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (either by name41 
or by title) were examined, as the former is the proper 
defendant in an appeal from the denial of benefits and the 
latter used to be.42 The first ten dispositive decisions on appeals 
from the denial of Social Security benefits (starting with the 
most recent) were canvassed to determine whether the judge 
affirmed the denial of benefits or reversed.43 
Decisions on recommendations submitted by magistrate 
judges were excluded from the sample,44 on the assumption 
that such opinions might reflect as much about the magistrate 
 
40. This Article will refer generically to “district court judges” for the 
sake of simplicity, though it should not be forgotten that many Social 
Security appeals are managed in the district courts by magistrates, who 
either issue decisions on behalf of the district court with the consent of the 
parties or present recommendations to district court judges on the proper 
resolution of the case. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the 
United States District Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 759 (2010) (noting that 
magistrates often handle Social Security matters). See Allen v. Astrue, 869 F. 
Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2012), for an example of a magistrate releasing a final 
opinion on a Social Security case while acting for the district court and with 
the consent of the litigants. See Proctor v. Astrue, No: 3:11-2139-TLW-JRM, 
2012 WL 5877439 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2012), adopted by district court, 2012 WL 
5877416 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2012), for an example of a magistrate’s 
recommendation to a district court judge in a Social Security appeal. 
41. Within the sample used here, the surnames of defendants that 
appear in cases are Astrue, Barnhart, Massanari, Halter, Apfel, Callahan, 
Chater, Shalala, Sullivan, and McMahon. 
42. See Robert E. Rains, The Advocate’s Conflicting Obligations Vis-a-Vis 
Adverse Medical Evidence in Social Security Proceedings, 50 SOC. SEC. REP. 
867, 870 n.35 (1996). 
43. Where a decision affirmed in part and reversed in part the denial of 
benefits, it was classified as a reversal for purposes of the study, on the 
grounds that (at least some of) the case was sent back to the Social Security 
Administration. See, e.g., Meinders v. Barnhart, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. 
Iowa 2002) (affirming the denial of disability insurance benefits but reversing 
the denial of supplemental security income benefits). 
44. See, e.g., Moore v. Astrue, No. 07-204-HRW, 2008 WL 2051019 (E.D. 
Ky. May 12, 2008). 
9
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as the district court judge,45 and might consequently distort the 
data. Also excluded were any cases that involved any 
procedural postures other than the final review on the merits of 
a denial of Social Security benefits.46 In this category, to cite a 
few of the more numerous types, fall orders on motions for 
attorney fees,47 decisions regarding only jurisdictional 
matters,48 various preliminary matters,49 orders in class 
actions,50 motions to alter or amend judgment,51 and so on. 
Note, however, that cases in which the survivors or guardians 
of a claimant representing his interests were included, on the 
grounds that the difference in whom the captioned plaintiff 
happens to be has no effect on the issues discussed here.52 
If the judge had a particularly high percentage of either 
affirmances or reversals, all of the rest of the judge’s Social 
Security decisions were consulted. After all of those statistics 
were compiled, the four judges with the most disproportionate 
numbers were selected. For each of those judges, a search was 
then conducted to find the judge in the same district, and 
ideally the same division, with the most extreme proclivities on 
the opposite side of the Social Security equation. For example, 
 
45. See, e.g., Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-
Tasking at Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 590 (1996) (“It is widely-
known that the magistrate judge’s [report and recommendation] is accepted 
by the district court in the vast majority of circumstances . . . .”). 
46. It goes without saying that the numerous cases in which the words 
“Social Security” appeared but which did not concern the appeal of the denial 
of benefits were also excluded. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 866 F. 
Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (mentioning the Social Security 
Administration in a criminal garnishment case). 
47. See, e.g., Deines v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-00127-WYD, 2012 WL 5430963 
(D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012). 
48. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-CV-6293L, 2009 
WL 2045684 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2009). 
49. See, e.g., Sawyers v. Astrue, No. 11-69-GWU, 2011 WL 5304093 (E.D. 
Ky. Nov. 3, 2011) (ruling on Commissioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground 
that action was untimely filed in federal court). 
50. See, e.g., Hogan v. Astrue, 859 F. Supp. 2d 543 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). 
51. See, e.g., Wells v. Astrue, No. 09-32-GWU, 2009 WL 5214488 (E.D. 
Ky. Dec. 23, 2009). 
52. See Wood ex rel. Wood v. Barnhart, No. Civ. 4-06-CV-00074, 2007 
WL 98354 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 16, 2007) (dealing with a husband seeking to 
collect benefits purportedly due his deceased spouse); Baldwin v. Astrue, No. 
11-CV-01553-WYD, 2012 WL 2190836 (D. Colo. June 14, 2012) (dealing with 
a mother seeking to collect benefits purportedly due her child). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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after Judge Pratt, in the Southern District of Iowa, had been 
discovered as a judge with one of the highest rates of reversals 
in the country, a search was conducted of other judges within 
the Southern District of Iowa to locate one with the highest 
rate of affirmances.53 
 
2. The Raw Data 
 
To get an idea as to the magnitude of the problem, consider 
four pairs of district court judges, two each from four different 
districts, four different states, and four different circuits. The 
differences within each pair in the disposition of Social Security 
appeals are nothing short of staggering. 
Let us begin in the West. There we encounter Judge 
Daniel, now of senior status, who plies his trade in Denver, in 
the District of Colorado, within the Tenth Circuit. Of the 58 
Social Security cases he reviewed between 2008 and 2012, 
Judge Daniel remanded all of them.54 His easily-calculated 
affirmance rate is 0%. Within roughly the same time-frame, 
Judge Arguello, a mere four floors from Judge Daniel in their 
Denver courthouse, has pronounced on 36 Social Security 
claims. In 26 of them she affirmed the denial of benefits, and in 
10 she reversed. Judge Arguello’s affirmance rate is therefore 
72%, which makes it 72% higher than that of her fellow 
Coloradan judge. 
From the Rocky Mountains travel east to Appalachia and 
visit Senior District Court Judge Wilhoit. He works in the 
Northern Division of the Eastern District of Kentucky, which 
falls within the bailiwick of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit. According to Westlaw, between 2000 and 
2010, Judge Wilhoit authored 76 opinions disposing of appeals 
 
53. The limitations of this research methodology are discussed infra Part 
III.A.3. A list of all the cases used in the Article is on file with the author. 
54. All numbers, as well as all case citations and any other information 
contained in the Article, are current through January 23, 2013. Any search 
referenced herein for illustrative purposes was conducted on that day as well. 
See, e.g., infra note 84. Subsequent case history on discretionary review 
includes any action on a case that took place after January 23, 2011. All 
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from the denial of Social Security benefits. Judge Wilhoit can 
be understood as something like the bizarro version of Judge 
Daniel. While Judge Daniel has never seen an ALJ decision 
that could not be sent back down, Judge Wilhoit appears never 
to have seen one that could not be vindicated for one reason or 
another. In every last one of Judge Wilhoit’s 76 cases he 
affirmed, giving rise to an affirmance rate of 100%. Now take 
Judge Unthank, a former colleague of Judge Wilhoit’s who is 
now retired. Judge Unthank also sat in the Northern Division 
of the Eastern District of Kentucky. From his chambers 140 
miles from Judge Wilhoit’s,55 Judge Unthank produced very 
different results in Social Security cases. Over the course of the 
same decade in which Judge Wilhoit upheld every single denial 
of benefits that crossed his desk, Judge Unthank reversed 249 
of the impressive 554 Social Security cases he ruled on. Thus, 
Judge Unthank’s affirmance rate can be pegged at 55%, 45% 
lower than his peer in the same division. 
Now head north, nearly as far as you can go while 
remaining within the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. Once you 
reach the banks of Lake Ontario, drop in on Judge Siragusa, an 
active judge in Rochester, in the Western District of New York, 
subject to the appellate powers of the Second Circuit. Between 
2000 and 2010, Judge Siragusa added 66 Social Security cases 
to Westlaw’s collection. He reversed the Commissioner in 58 of 
them and affirmed in 8, leading to an affirmance rate of 12%. 
During the same period, and from the same courthouse, Judge 
Larimer took up 73 Social Security cases, reversing the ALJ 38 
times and affirming him 35 times, for an affirmance rate of 
48%, 36% higher than Judge Siragusa’s. 
Return westward for our final destination. Senior District 
Court Judge Pratt presides in the Central Division of the 
Southern District of Iowa, under the Eighth Circuit’s watchful 
eye. According to Westlaw, Judge Pratt has written 100 
decisions in Social Security cases of the sort analyzed here over 
the course of his career on the bench, which began in 1997 and 
continues to the present day.56 He reversed the 
 
55. Judge Wilhoit sits in Ashland, Kentucky while Judge Unthank sat in 
Covington, Kentucky. 
56. Westlaw gives one decision two separate entries, but they are 
identical in every respect and the case has therefore been counted only once. 
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Administration’s denial of benefits in 86 of them. Without 
resort to a calculator we can determine that his affirmance rate 
is 14%. Compare Judge Pratt’s numbers to those of his 
colleague, Judge Longstaff. Judge Longstaff, like Judge Pratt, 
is a Senior District Court Judge serving in the Central Division 
of the Southern District of Iowa. Despite these similarities, 
however, the two judges diverge sharply in their approach to 
Social Security cases. Judge Longstaff has issued 37 Social 
Security opinions from when he first received his commission 
in 1991 until today. In 22 of them he reversed the 
Administration’s determination not to award benefits, and in 
15 he affirmed that determination. Judge Longstaff’s reversal 




Before we embark on a more detailed consideration of 
these rather striking numbers, consider first the limitations of 
the data and the caveats that must accompany them. Most 
importantly, it is not an exhaustive sample. The methodology 
employed was not designed to reveal all of the judges with the 
most disproportionate numbers in Social Security cases. 
Perhaps most obviously, the data does not cover every district, 
nor even every circuit. Additionally, the search identified 
judges by a relatively small (and possibly misrepresentative) 
initial sample.57 That is, it could be that a judge whose first ten 
Social Security cases revealed a substantial discrepancy 
actually had a more balanced overall total than a judge whose 
first ten indicated relative parity. Finally, Westlaw, the search 
engine used to conduct the research, does not contain all 
decisions.58 Indeed, it is particularly likely to omit the kind of 
short, unpublished opinions that are often issued by district 
 
Compare Pinault v. Apfel, No. 3-99-CV-90162, 2000 WL 33362000 (S.D. Iowa 
Nov. 13, 2000), with Pinault v. Apfel, No. 3-99-CV-90162, 2000 WL 35639960 
(S.D. Iowa Nov. 13, 2000). 
57. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
58. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies 
of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 617, 652 n.163 (2010). 
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courts in Social Security cases.59 
Even so, these issues counsel only against extrapolating 
any over-broad lessons from the data, not against using them 
for present purposes. A problem with four districts, in four 
circuits, is surely a problem to be reckoned with, and there is 
no reason to suppose all the other districts are free from the 
infirmity. Additionally, the research methodology was designed 
not to delineate with any precision the extent of the problem of 
inconsistency in Social Security adjudications in district court, 
but rather only to establish that there is in fact such a problem 
and that it needs attending to. Consequently, it is sufficient 
that the searches reveal some judges with fairly 
disproportionate numbers, and to find judges in the same 
districts with substantially different numbers. 
Relatedly, the research method employed is far from exact. 
For ease of research, the relatively few cases in which the 
government did not oppose a remand60 (or actually sought 
one61) were counted alongside the far more numerous cases in 
which it did register its opposition, as were claims that had 
already been remanded by the court to the Social Security 
Administration at least once before.62 Such distinctions 
undoubtedly alter the likelihood of a particular result.63 
Likewise, to facilitate the speediest possible research, decisions 
that were amended on reconsideration were still counted with 
reference to the original disposition, even if that disposition 
 
59. See generally Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic 
Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. 
REV. 107 (2007) (commenting on the absence from legal search engines of 
many unpublished opinions); Stephen L. Wasby, Publication (or Not) of 
Appellate Rulings: An Evaluation of Guidelines, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 
41, 87 (2005) (maintaining that Social Security cases are “prime candidates” 
for being unpublished) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). 
60. See, e.g., Green v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-01141-CMA, 2011 WL 4632570 
(D. Colo. Oct. 6, 2011). 
61. See, e.g., Petersen v. Apfel, No. 3-00-CV-90143, 2001 WL 741735 
(S.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2001). 
62. See, e.g., Scott v. Barnhart, 592 F. Supp. 2d 360 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 
63. See, e.g., Toni M. Fine, Agency Requests for “Voluntary” Remand: A 
Proposal for the Development of Judicial Standards, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1079, 
1081 (1996) (commenting on “a greater [judicial] willingness to allow an 
agency to reconsider a final order that is already pending judicial review”). 
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changed later on.64 Regardless, because all of these types of 
cases represent a small minority of the sample, because they 
roughly equalize across all of the judges and, most importantly, 
because the data reveals such large margins, this slight 
inexactitude does not undermine the validity of the numbers. 
In addition to being inexact, the sample paints with a 
broad brush. Most significantly, it ignores the distinction 
between the two types of remands available to district courts: 
remands for further administrative proceedings and remands 
with instructions to calculate and award benefits.65 Obviously 
this is not a trivial distinction. Nevertheless, for purposes of 
the present task, it suffices to call attention to the simpler and 
more basic inconsistency in the system——that between 
remands and affirmances——before delving into the subtler 
inconsistencies within the remands themselves. Such an 
approach is recommended by the fact that a remand, even if 
only for a rehearing, still constitutes a reversal of the ALJ, and 
thus still represents a sharp divergence from an affirmance, 
and further recommended by the fact that most remands for 
rehearings do still lead to the ultimate award of benefits.66 
Hopefully future commentators will explore some of the issues 
regarding district court decisions about which type of remand 
to order.67 
 
64. See, e.g., Bayer v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-02389-WYD, 2010 WL 2035540 
(D. Colo. May 21, 2010) (amending a previous order in a Social Security case). 
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010). Compare Rose v. Astrue, 888 F. Supp. 
2d 936 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (remanding for further proceedings) with Boertje v. 
Astrue, 848 F. Supp. 2d 952 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (remanding for the immediate 
award of benefits), for examples of either type of order taken from the sample 
used here. 
66. See Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 7, at 783 n.241 (averring that 
“claimants are ultimately awarded benefits in the majority of remands” for 
rehearing). 
67. Indeed, there are some interesting questions raised by the sample 
under consideration here. Of Judge Pratt’s 86 reversals (out of 100 cases), 66 
of them were for the award of benefits, representing 66% of his total opinions 
and 77% of his reversals. By contrast, Judge Daniel decided 58 cases, 
reversed all of them, and only remanded 10 for the award of benefits and the 
other 48 for further proceedings. Thus, although Judges Pratt and Daniel 
have comparable reversal rates, they have radically different rates of 
awarding benefits, with the latter doing so in only 17% of both his cases and 
his reversals. Such a difference is nearly as striking as the more fundamental 
difference between affirmers and reversers, and could be a fruitful area of 
15
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Lastly, the undeniably erratic nature of Westlaw poses no 
impediment to the conclusions drawn from the data, because 
there is no reason to suppose that Westlaw stores more district 
court opinions reversing the Social Security Administration 
than those affirming it, or vice versa, the only type of 
inconsistency that would potentially prevent us from drawing 
the conclusions presented below.68 Indeed, the very fact that 
several judges have been found on either side of the ledger 
through Westlaw searches, and in the same districts to boot, 
strongly suggests that the engine is not meaningfully skewing 
the results for any individual judge. 
It must also be remembered that the data here has not 
been assembled to cast aspersions on the record of any judge. 
Although the existence of such large differences between judges 
in the same districts is certainly cause for concern, it remains 
to be seen where exactly those concerns should be directed. For 
a disparity between two judges on a given issue says nothing 
about which judge is in the right, if either. In Rochester, New 
York, for example, Judge Siragusa affirmed 12% of Social 
Security appeals while his colleague in the same city, Judge 
Larimer, affirmed 48%. The gap demonstrates a problem with 
divergent results, but it does not point us to a percentage, or 
even a range, that we could confidently deem desirable or 
acceptable. It could be the case that 88% of appeals in the 
division are meritless, thus justifying Judge Siragusa’s data. 
Or it could be the case that 38% of claimants did not receive, at 
the very least, the process they were entitled to, thus 
validating Judge Larimer.69 In either event, however, there is a 
 
study for others to pick up on. 
68. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1973, 1993 n.63 (2009) (noting that selection bias should not be an 
issue with Westlaw or Lexis) (citation omitted); but see Redish, et al., supra 
note 58, at 652 n.163 (“Quantitative legal research from databases such as 
Westlaw and Lexis may have inherent selection biases because they do not 
include every case, nor are the available cases randomly selected.”). 
69. With respect to the judges with more one-sided statistics, such an 
argument may be harder to press. Nevertheless, it should be observed that 
certain Social Security offices have been accused of widespread incompetence 
or abuse. See Calloway v. Mathews, CCH Unempl. Ins. Rpts. ¶ 14,879 (S.D. 
Cal. 1976) (remanding several Social Security appeals for rehearing before 
new ALJs because ALJ decisions contained analysis composed entirely of 
boilerplate and devoid of independent reasoning and application of the law to 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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problem, and that is the point of the study. 
 
4. Significance of the Data 
 
What, then, does the data mean? This is not a question 
that need detain us long, for the presentation of the numbers 
alone conveys their significance. Ultimately, the only research 
findings that matter for present purposes are the margins 
between the affirmance rates70 between judges in the same 
division. Those margins are: 1) 74% between Judges Daniel 
and Arguello; 2) 45% between Judges Wilhoit and Unthank; 3) 
36% between Judges Siragusa and Larimer; and 4) 27% 
between Judges Pratt and Longstaff. By any estimation, these 
are substantial and troubling discrepancies. One way to 
understand the numbers is to imagine two individuals who 
seek benefits at the same agency, under the same laws and 
regulations, suffer the same fate (a loss) before the ALJ, appeal 
to the same court, in the same division of the same district of 
the same state, bound by the same appellate case law. After 
following such remarkably similar paths, however, the two 
individuals have drastically different chances of obtaining 
benefits, purely by virtue of the random assignment of judges. 
It is not too hyperbolic to declare that such inconsistency 
 
the facts); Sam Dolnick, Suit Alleges Bias in Disability Denials by Queens 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/nyregion/13disability.html?_r=0 
(reporting on a class action lawsuit against a Social Security office for 
excessive denials and inappropriate conduct); Damian Paletta, Disability-
Claim Judge has Trouble Saying ‘No’, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704681904576319163605918
524.html (reporting on an ALJ who awarded benefits in all but four of 1284 
cases for one fiscal year and in all 729 cases in the first six months of 
another). Thus, even where a district court judge has an overwhelming 
propensity to reverse determinations by the Administration, that propensity 
could, in theory, be chalked up to an office that performs particularly poorly. 
Contrariwise, a district court judge with the opposite propensity might be 
operating in an area with especially diligent and accurate ALJs. At any rate, 
though, these arguments fall outside the scope of the Article and will not be 
discussed further. 
70. For ease of comparison, the margins are presented in terms of 
affirmance rates. Obviously, the contrast between reversal rates is equally 
meaningful and equally striking. 
17
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tears at the very fabric of our legal system.71 
To see this enormous inconsistency in perspective, query 
how distressing it would be if some other type of decision, 
commonly recurring and crucially important to the individual 
involved, were vulnerable to the same vicissitudes. For 
instance, what if Judge A granted 0% of Fourth Amendment 
motions to suppress while Judge B, in the adjoining courtroom, 
granted 74% of them. The liberty of the defendants who came 
before such judges would be inextricably tied, not to the law 
but, to the personal predilections of the adjudicators. Although 
Social Security benefits cannot compete in importance with 
freedom from imprisonment, they are exceptionally significant 
to the individual claimants and, in the aggregate, to all 
American taxpayers.72 In sum, there is tremendous 
inconsistency within judicial districts in the resolution of Social 
Security appeals and it is an inconsistency with grave 
ramifications for the legal system as a whole. 
 
B. Lack of Appellate Guidance 
 
The second overarching problem, which, in conjunction 
with the inconsistency noted above, gives rise to the rest of the 
problems, is that there is very little useful guidance from the 
circuit courts. In an ideal world, the circuit courts would take 
the lead in ensuring the same uniformity in Social Security 
results that they are supposed to generate in all areas of law, 
at least within their respective circuits.73 Unfortunately, 
 
71. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (reminding that 
we have embraced “the concept of a government of laws and not men”). 
72. See Thomas P. Smith & Patrick M. Fahey, Some Points on Litigating 
Title II and Title XVI Social Security Disability Claims in United States 
District Court, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 243, 272 (1994) (“Social Security 
disability cases are among the most important matters litigated in U.S. 
District Courts, for they generally involve claims made by ordinary people in 
desperate circumstances.”). 
73. See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. 
Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1525 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[U]niform decisionmaking 
within each circuit is essential.”); see also Morton Denlow, Substantial 
Evidence Review in Social Security Cases as an Issue of Fact, 2 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 99, 121 (2007) (“No one contends that the Supreme Court or circuit 
courts should not establish the broader legal principles governing the Social 
Security Act that affect all, or a majority of, the social security cases.”). 
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however, they do not appear to be doing the job. Not only have 
the circuits failed to establish consistency between the sister 
courts,74 more to the point of this Article they have not created 
anything remotely resembling uniformity within each circuit. 
To see this is so, one need not look further than the data 
presented here.75 If two judges in the same building generate 
such disparate results, there is no reason to believe two judges 
sitting hundreds of miles away are on the same page. Nor is 
the Supreme Court filling the gap, as it rarely grants certiorari 
on Social Security disability appeals and almost never does so 
in order to clarify the actual standards that apply to awarding 
benefits.76 
The reasons for the lack of appellate guidance in Social 
Security cases are several. Perhaps the most obvious is the 
decision by many losing litigants not to appeal unfavorable 
dispositions in district court. An examination of the cases 
under consideration here discloses the miniscule percentage of 
appeals from around the country, regardless of the outcome in 
district court. Consider the three judges with the most lopsided 
rates in the sample: Judge Daniel, with his 100% reverse rate, 
Judge Wilhoit with his 100% affirmance rate, and Judge Pratt, 
with his 86% reverse rate.77 Of Judge Daniel’s 58 remands, 
Westlaw does not reflect a single one undergoing review by the 
Tenth Circuit.78 On the opposite pole, of Judge Wilhoit’s 76 
affirmances, only three made it to the Sixth Circuit.79 As with 
 
74. See generally Susan Haire & Stefanie Lindquist, An Agency and 12 
Courts: Social Security Disability Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 80 
JUDICATURE 230 (1997) (examining the lack of uniformity among the circuits 
in Social Security cases). 
75. See supra Part III.A.2. 
76. See generally Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda -- 
And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006) (noting throughout the 
discrepancy between the importance Americans place on the Social Security 
program and the attention it receives at the Supreme Court). 
77. See supra Part III.A.2. 
78. To estimate the number of appeals, Westlaw’s direct history function 
was employed. While that function does not list every appeal, it does list 
most, and can thus be used with some degree of accuracy. See, e.g., Elise 
Borochoff, Comment, Lower Court Compliance with Supreme Court Remands, 
24 TOURO L. REV. 849, 883 n.104 (2008) (describing use of direct history 
function for legal research). 
79. See Louden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 507 F. App’x 497 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (unanimously affirming Judge Wilhoit’s decision upholding the 
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Judge Daniel’s rulings, the government declined to challenge 
any of Judge Pratt’s 86 remands at the Eighth Circuit.80 It is 
fair to say that the vast majority of Social Security appeals 
begin and end their time in the Article III courts without 
advancing from the first rung to the second.81 
In the case of claimants, it is not difficult to guess why 
many decline to pursue their appellate rights: most do not 
possess the resources to do so.82 This is especially true in 
Kentucky, one of the poorest states in the union.83 It is less 
clear why the government appeals so few adverse decisions in 
the district courts, given that it has far deeper pockets and 
given the eagerness with which other federal agencies file 
appeals.84 In its Social Security track record with Judges 
Daniel and Pratt, the federal government has lost its case a 
staggering 91% of the time, and has not once sought to reverse 
its fate in a higher tribunal.85 For a litigant that is not 
 
Commissioner’s denial of benefits); Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 330 F. 
App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); Deaton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 315 F. App’x 
595 (6th Cir. 2009) (same). 
80. Interestingly, the only Social Security appeal of Judge Pratt’s that 
found its way to the court of appeals was one of the few cases in which he 
affirmed the denial of benefits, and that decision was in turn reversed by the 
Eighth Circuit. See Tang v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000). 
81. Cf. Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 7, at 739 (“Social Security cases 
represented 5.86 percent of all civil district court cases, but only 2.5 percent 
of all civil cases in the courts of appeals.”) (footnote omitted). 
82. See, e.g., Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529, 538 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(noting that “most [Social Security] claimants are poor and not well 
educated”). 
83. See Income of Households by State Ranked from Highest to Lowest 
Using 3-Year Average Medians, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/statemedian/ (last visited Jan. 
23, 2013) (ranking Kentucky the seventh poorest state in the country by 
median household income). 
84. For instance, a search of “Department of Labor, Appellant” among 
circuit court decisions yields 270 hits, a fairly impressive tally for an agency 
involved in far less litigation than the Social Security Administration. See 
supra note 54 (referring to the currency of search results). 
85. One recourse the government has to challenge an adverse decision 
short of a full-fledged appeal is to file a motion to alter or amend with the 
district court itself, an option it appears to periodically take in Social Security 
cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Callahan, 985 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Iowa 1997). This 
mechanism does not compensate for the paucity of appeals to circuit court, 
however, first and foremost because the Social Security Administration does 
not use it nearly enough for it to fulfill that role. Plus, there is no true 
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accustomed to losing,86 and one that would have to be blind not 
to absorb the magnitude of its failure, the refusal of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices in the District of Colorado and the Southern 
District of Iowa to pursue appellate satisfaction is nothing 
short of inexplicable. Indeed, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits are 
hardly known as excessively liberal courts,87 and the likelihood 
of prevailing on appeal in such cases would seem that much 
greater. At the risk of hyperbole, one wonders why the 
government would bother to contest a claim at all, including in 
district court, if it remains perfectly willing to accept sky-high 
remand rates. Certainly the decision to refrain from filing an 
appeal could not be plausibly grounded on concern for the 
public fisc, as a remand for further administrative proceedings 
burns up substantial taxpayer funds,88 as, of course, does a 
 
substitute for fresh appellate review, particularly in cases, like the ones at 
issue here, where the higher court owes no deference to the district court, see, 
e.g., White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005), and particularly 
where the lower court judge has already demonstrated a propensity to favor 
one side over another. See generally Jonah J. Horwitz, Certifiable: Certificates 
of Appealability, Habeas Corpus, and the Perils of Self-Judging, 17 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 695 (2012) (questioning the ability of trial courts to 
searchingly examine their own rulings). 
86. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative 
Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 732 n.354 (2009) (referring to a study 
that found “that the federal government, as an appellant, tended to win more 
often than other appellants”). 
87. See Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of 
Appeals More Liberal or Conservative than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 
172 (2011) (reciting the “standard lore” that the Eighth Circuit is one “of the 
most conservative” circuits) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal 
Constitutional Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 246 (2008) (characterizing the 
Tenth Circuit as “a fairly conservative court on criminal procedure issues”); 
Calvin TerBeek, A Call for Precedential Heads: Why the Supreme Court’s 
Eyewitness Identification Jurisprudence is Anachronistic and Out-of-Step 
with the Empirical Reality, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 21, 50 (2007) (listing “the 
more liberal circuits” as the Second and the Ninth) (footnotes omitted). 
88. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) (observing 
the costs associated with administrative hearings). It also bears mention that 
attorney fees are available for prevailing parties in Social Security appeals. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2011). Thus, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
declines to appeal a loss at the district court it also makes it likely that the 
government will later pay the claimant’s attorney fees, imposing an even 
greater expense upon the taxpayer. See, e.g., Zapien v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-
00951-WYD, 2011 WL 4808175 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2011) (awarding attorney 
fees to the claimant after a remand for further administrative proceedings). 
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reward. 
Whatever the reasons for the government’s overwhelming 
inactivity, though, the consequences are troubling. And they 
are compounded by the fact that the circuit courts resolve a 
substantial majority of the Social Security appeals that are 
filed in unpublished, and often summary or very brief, 
opinions,89 thus failing to promote uniformity even with the 




The inconsistency at the district court level, in combination 
with the lack of guidance from higher courts, damages the 
system in a number of ways. First, fairness. It requires no 
sophisticated legal analysis to see the inequity of one 
individual receiving benefits while another with the same 
infirmity goes without them.90 The discrepancy is particularly 
distressing where the two individuals live within the same 
geographical area (i.e., judicial district). For with divergent 
 
Unsurprisingly, the government routinely declines to oppose such motions. A 
search on Westlaw among district court cases for “social security” & 
unopposed /s motion /s “attorney! fees” retrieved 184 opinions. See supra note 
54 (referring to the currency of search results). 
89. See Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial 
Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 496 (2004) (categorizing appeals from 
disability denials among the “entire classes of appeals deemed routine” and 
thus less likely to result in reported opinions) (footnote omitted); William M. 
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New 
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 
295 (1996) (“A court is far less likely to hear oral argument or issue a 
published opinion in a social security” case versus another type of case.); 
Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions 
and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 940, 952-53 (1989) (including Social Security cases in a list of “subject-
matter areas where unpublished opinions predominate” in the U.S. courts of 
appeal) (footnotes omitted); David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: 
Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1667, 1693 n.95 (2005) (proposing that “unpublished opinions dispose 
disproportionately of cases brought by . . . social security recipients,” among 
others) (citation omitted); Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-
Precedential Decision: An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
175, 195 (2001) (counting Social Security cases among those where courts are 
less likely to publish the opinion). 
90. See generally Capowski, supra note 33. 
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outcomes between different judicial districts one can at least 
make the argument, though not incontrovertibly, that different 
regions might have different needs, and that the judiciary 
should be sensitive to such differences.91 No such argument is 
available with respect to two individuals in the same area. It is 
beyond cavil that two individuals, living in the same area, 





The problem with the lack of predictability is closely 
related to the lack of consistency and fairness, but it presents 
additional concerns as well. To start with the overlap, 
predictability is a virtue in itself, one of the paramount values 
nurtured by a well-functioning common law system.93 If 
different judges within the same district treat equal claims 
differently, no one involved in the process can make an 
educated decision as to how to proceed. The whole thing 
becomes a crapshoot, quite literally the luck of the draw. As a 
result, the individual, quite likely of modest means, has no idea 
whether it makes sense to appeal the ALJ’s adverse decision. 
Indeed, the ALJ himself will find it difficult to decide the claim 
in the first place, faced with erratic rulings from different 
district court judges. With uniformity, claimants, typically 
advised by attorneys with some expertise in Social Security 
 
91. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey 
and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319 (1977) (proposing a “‘local option’ 
plan” for diversity cases to reflect “the likelihood that the need for diversity 
jurisdiction is greater in some districts than in others and would allow an 
opportunity for local experimentation”). 
92. See Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953) (rejecting a 
theory that would result in the rights of parties fluctuating depending “on 
which ‘side’ of the same courthouse” the case was heard). 
93. See Fleeger v. Wyeth, 771 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. 2009) 
(“[F]ollowing precedent promotes stability, order, and predictability in the 
law.”) (citation omitted); Mary Garvey Algero, Considering Precedent in 
Louisiana: Balancing the Value of Predictable and Certain Interpretation 
with the Tradition of Flexibility and Adaptability, 58 LOY. L. REV. 113, 114 
(2012) (concluding that civil law jurisdictions “have come to value the 
predictability and certainty that come with the common law doctrine”). 
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cases,94 will have a sense as to when a claim is potentially 
meritorious, and when it is doomed to failure. They will avoid 
the latter, and the government will thereby avoid the expense 




As with some of the other issues listed, the efficiency 
concerns overlap with other concerns. For present purposes, 
they are best understood in terms of the smooth functioning of 
the judiciary itself. In the current system, a district court judge 
reviewing a Social Security appeal could locate a decision by a 
judge working in the same district, resolving a highly similar 
case, and still have to ask: how persuasive is this opinion?95 In 
the world envisioned by this Article, the same judge poses a 
very different question: how do I faithfully apply the rule of the 
previous case? And, if the two are on all fours, there is little 
inquiry to conduct at all. The judge’s only duty at that point is 
to declare that the prior precedent controls the outcome, and 
that is that.96 Living as we do in an era with large and ever-
increasing backlogs in district court dockets,97 there is great 
 
94. Frank S. Bloch, et al., Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record 
in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security 
Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (acknowledging that 
“most [Social Security] claimants are now represented by an attorney”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
95. See Stewart v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-02231-RBJ, 2012 WL 694320, at *6 
n.1 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 2012) (pointing out that “persuasive precedent from this 
District[,]” including a published opinion, offered guidance in resolving a 
Social Security issue) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Smith v. Astrue, 
No. 3:09CV488, 2011 WL 1303637, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (“[T]he 
court believes the collective decisions of this district [regarding Social 
Security claims] are most persuasive . . . .”) (emphasis added), aff’d, 457 F. 
App’x 326 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
96. See Agnew-Currie v. Astrue, 875 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972 (D. Ariz. 2012) 
(recognizing in a Social Security case that the district court is bound by 
published decisions of the circuit court “and cannot simply declare it all 
overruled”) (footnote omitted); Ridings v. Apfel, 76 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (W.D. 
Va. 1999) (noting that the district court’s disagreement with the circuit 
court’s decisions regarding an issue of Social Security law was irrelevant as 
the district court was “bound by its precedent”). 
97. See Carl Tobias, Filling Federal Appellate Vacancies, 41 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 829, 864 (2009) (making note of “the civil backlogs of district courts”); 
Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum, 2005 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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appeal in a model that will further expedite the disposition of a 
large number of cases. Indeed, the appeal is enhanced by the 
fact that meritorious Social Security claimants in particular 
should not be forced to wait long periods before receiving their 
deserved benefits, as they currently do.98 
To a lesser but still noteworthy extent, uniformity in the 
district courts can also be expected to facilitate efficiency in the 
administrative process. As noted, that process is as plagued 
with delays as the one that unfolds in the judiciary.99 Were the 
district courts to begin acting in a more unified fashion, the 
Administration would presumably follow along to some degree, 
if grudgingly. Add “grudgingly” only because the 
Administration has already demonstrated a somewhat 
alarming tendency to overtly flout judicial precedent, even that 
set by the circuit courts.100 Despite that history, it is not too 
naïve to expect at least some ALJs to follow in the footsteps of 
more consistent and predictable district courts, if only out of 
fear of reversal.101 
 
IV. The Solution 
 
The proposal is simple: when a district court issues a 
published opinion resolving the appeal of a denial of Social 
Security disability benefits, that decision is binding precedent 
for the judicial district as a whole. A district court judge would 
make the decision whether to publish or not to publish, much 
 
UTAH L. REV. 743, 761 (2005) (“[N]umerous district courts experience 
substantial civil backlogs . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
98. See Drew A. Swank, The Social Security Administration’s Condoning 
of and Colluding with Attorney Misconduct, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 517-19 
(2012) (noting the huge backlog in Social Security cases in recent years). 
99. See id. 
100. See generally Angela M. Johnson, Note, The Social Security 
Administration's Policy of Nonacquiescence, 62 IND. L.J. 1101 (1987). 
101. Cf. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 
1139 (D.D.C. 1984) (finding it reasonable that the parties believed ALJs 
might seek “to avoid reversal or remand by the Appeals Council”); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating 
the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 333 n.347 (1986) 
(asserting that ALJs working for the Food and Drug Administration 
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as circuit court panels do.102 If a majority of judges in the 
district disagree with the decision, they can, sitting en banc, 
overrule it, a power they already enjoy,103 though one they 
rarely employ.104 
To be sure, there would be kinks to work out. Perhaps the 
most pressing issue to resolve would be establishing a clear, 
consistent practice for when to publish opinions and when not 
to. As it stands, the guidelines under which district court 
judges are supposed to operate when deciding whether to 
release a decision in the federal supplement are, at best, rather 
vague,105 and are either ignored or applied quite differently by 
different judges.106 In fact, the opinions under consideration 
here offer a perfect example of the inconsistency in publication 
decisions. Judge Pratt has issued 122 opinions containing the 
words “Social Security;” 110 of them are reported in the federal 
supplement. Judge Wilhoit has 121 cases on Westlaw where 
the words “Social Security” appear in the text; four of them are 
published. These are discrepancies on the same order of 
magnitude as the difference in dispositions between the two 
judges’ cases.107 Needless to say, different district court judges 
have very different considerations in mind when deciding 
whether to publish a given opinion. 
The obstacles are eminently surmountable. District court 
judges are likely so inconsistent, at least in part, because so 
little rides on the outcome. An opinion in the federal 
supplement may attract more attention from scholars and 
 
102. See generally Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 325 (2001). 
103. See generally John R. Bartels, United States District Courts En 
Banc - Resolving the Ambiguities, 73 JUDICATURE 40 (1989). 
104. See Mead, supra note 10, at 809 (“Currently, district court en banc 
proceedings are extremely rare . . . .”). 
105. See Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision 
to Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 121 (2004) (noting that the “formal rules 
governing publication” in the district courts “are quite broad”). 
106. See id. at 123 (arguing that judges make decisions about what to 
publish based on a wide variety of reasons, including “to make good law, to 
advance policy, . . . to enhance their prestige among their reference group[,]” 
as well as for purposes of “easing their day-to-day work life” and to “strive for 
good relations with those with whom they work regularly”).   
107. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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other judges,108 but that is still a far different thing than an 
opinion either having or not having the force of law.109 Once 
district courts become accustomed to publishing binding 
decisions, they can be expected to treat the question of whether 
or not to publish with the care it demands. 
As mentioned, this Article is primarily dedicated to the 
practicalities of the proposal, not potential conceptual 
challenges that might be raised in opposition to it. 
Nevertheless, it is worth pausing to briefly address the 
weightiest of those challenges. Recall the main advantages 
ascribed to the current distribution of precedent-making 
authority. To reiterate, they are 1) the balance that comes with 
multi-judge panels; 2) less urgency at the appellate courts and 
so more time to study the development of the law; 3) greater 
formality and structure at the courts of appeals; 4) the prestige 
of the appellate courts and its capacity for attracting cerebral 
jurists; and 5) the purifying effect of elevating the common law 
to the rarified air of the appellate courts.110 
Two of these rationales either support the proposed reform, 
or at least do not cut against it. To the extent that appellate 
proceedings are less urgent or more formal than trial 
proceedings, Social Security cases offer the same advantages to 
 
108. Compare Pinault v. Apfel, No. 3-99-CV-90162, 2000 WL 33362000 
(S.D. Iowa, Nov. 13, 2000) (deciding a Social Security appeal in a thirteen-
page unpublished opinion that has never been cited by a case, secondary 
source, or appellate brief), with Strong v. Apfel, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (S.D. 
Iowa 2000) (deciding a Social Security appeal in a seven-page published 
opinion that has been cited by two courts, three secondary sources, and four 
appellate briefs). 
109. Indeed, even in terms of attracting citations, the difference between 
a published and unpublished circuit court decision is far greater than that 
between a published and unpublished district court opinion, thus 
underscoring the pivotal importance of whether an opinion constitutes 
binding precedent——rather than what court it emerges from——in the 
amount of influence it has. Take the only Social Security opinion of Judge 
Pratt’s to be reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. It resulted in a published 
opinion that has been cited in 50 cases and 13 secondary sources. Tang v. 
Apfel, 205 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000); see supra note 54 (referring to the 
currency of search results). Contrast that with an unpublished Social 
Security decision from the Eighth Circuit released around the same time, 
which has been cited in one case and by no secondary sources. Schach v. 
Apfel, 210 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see supra note 54 (referring 
to the currency of search results). 
110. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
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the district courts that they do the circuit courts. After all, 
Social Security cases are appeals at the district court level. 
This is not to say that claimants have no right to a speedy 
determination regarding the merits of their claims. Nor is it to 
say that society has no interest in expediting the smooth 
functioning of such an important government program. Plainly, 
both claimants and the country at large do have those 
interests.111 It is only to say that neither justification can 
plausibly be used as a reason for denying district courts the 
power to issue binding decisions in the Social Security context, 
as they are already acting in an appellate capacity. 
The remaining rationales for the current regime do 
militate against the proposal. But two of those rationales—
numbers 4 and 5—are based on the assumption that judges on 
the courts of appeals enjoy such greater stature than their 
colleagues below that it meaningfully improves the quality of 
their work. That assumption is far from beyond doubt, as 
district court judges wield substantial powers, indeed, in some 
respects, more power than circuit court judges, as they resolve 
many more disputes.112 District court judges also possess 
comparable prestige because, in large measure, they share 
many qualities with circuit judges: nomination by the 
president, confirmation by the Senate, life tenure, protection 
against pay decreases, assistance from top law school 
graduates serving as clerks, and involvement in high-profile 
controversies.113 
Ultimately, then, the only significant conceptual 
impediment to the proposal is the multi-judge nature of the 
 
111. See Mills v. Heckler, 595 F. Supp. 952, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(discussing a Social Security claimant’s right to a speedy resolution of his 
request for benefits); see also Wolfe v. Barnhart, 446 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (examining the public’s interest in having an efficient Social 
Security system). 
112. See David R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral 
Argument in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 119, 139 n.116 (2012) (calculating that only 20% of 
the cases filed in federal district courts between 2010 and 2011 were 
appealed to circuit courts). 
113. Cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit 
Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1397 (1991) (commenting on the 
“highly prestigious office” occupied by district court judges and attributing 
the prestige to some of the qualities mentioned above). 
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circuit court panel versus the solitary district court judge 
deciding the Social Security appeal. As an initial matter, this 
theory too is not on the solidest ground. It is open to question 
whether circuit courts do in fact produce more balanced, 
thoughtful work as the result of their collaborative approach. 
For starters, “balance” is not necessarily an unadulterated 
good. It is a cliché with some truth that government 
committees often sacrifice decisive, tough-minded action for 
ponderous, platitudinous waffling, and a circuit court panel is a 
government committee of a sort, and vulnerable to the same 
charge.114 Further, in low-profile cases, as the Social Security 
cases under consideration most certainly are, the members of 
the panel may not pay a great deal of attention to the opinion, 
let alone engage in any meaningful debate over the result.115 
Additionally, many panels may be so ideologically homogenous 
that the tempering effect of revising to appease other 
perspectives is largely absent.116 All of these are reasons to 
keep an open mind to the prospect of altering the traditional 
conception of law-making authority as exclusively in the 
province of multi-judge panels. One of them—the hands-off, 
conveyor-belt approach often taken by the circuit courts to 
mundane everyday matters—has particular force here, as it 
indicates that the utility of the multi-judge model is especially 
 
114. See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of 
the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 662 (2008) 
(determining that U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions often become longer 
and longer as the author of the majority opinion seeks to accommodate the 
views of his colleagues); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 n.13 (1985) (describing a transition 
from three-judge to single-judge trial courts in civil law countries and 
explaining it partly as a reaction to the slowness of the former). 
115. See Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and 
Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 699 
(2001) (discovering that staff attorneys at the circuit courts do much of the 
work on Social Security appeals); Wasby, supra note 59, at 87 (suggesting 
that Social Security cases are “prime candidates” for being unpublished); cf. 
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 89, at 279 n.15 (“Complaints about lack of 
oral argument, unpublished opinions, and ‘one-judge’ opinions go back many 
decades.”) (citation omitted). 
116. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Partisan Dimensions of Federal 
Preemption in the United States Courts of Appeals, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 223, 
246 (2011) (discussing “ideological ‘panel effects’--the tendency of like-minded 
individuals, when deliberating in an ideologically homogenous group, to 
reinforce one another’s biases”). 
29
  
2014] SOCIAL INSECURITY 59 
limited in the Social Security context. The same could be said 
of the desire for institutional legitimacy, the view that the 
signature of three judges at the bottom of an order appears 
more authoritative to the public than does a single name.117 We 
need only take into account the public perception where the 
public is paying attention;118 it would be fanciful, to say the 
least, to imagine that many citizens are impatiently waiting for 
the latest pronouncement from the federal courts on, say, the 
proper formulation of a question from an ALJ to a vocational 
expert regarding the amount of time a claimant is able to 
perform sedentary work.119 
Even granting that there is at least some benefit to the old 
practice, as there undoubtedly is, one must still balance that 
benefit against the gains to be achieved by the suggested new 
practice. If granting precedent-forming power to the district 
courts in Social Security cases would in fact bring uniformity, 
efficiency, and fairness to an essential program that profoundly 
affects the lives of millions of people, perhaps that might be 
enough to outweigh the advantages that come from multi-judge 
deliberations. At this juncture, it bears reiterating that the 
category of cases that would be implicated by the change 
constitute a quite discrete group, bounded by a firm and easily-
demarcated line. There is thus no need to fear any inadvertent 
spill-over effect on other areas of law.120 The long-running 
ambiguity surrounding the power vel non of bankruptcy 
appellate panels to create binding precedent121 gives us good 
 
117. Cf. Douglas, supra note 13, at 483 (“[T]he more judges that sign on 
to an opinion, the more likely court-watchers and the public will view it as 
the correct result.”) (footnote omitted). 
118. See Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting 
Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 127 (1996) (“To the extent that 
anyone, inside or outside the legal community, really pays attention, there is 
perhaps some added value to having three judges” decide a case for purposes 
of institutional legitimacy.). 
119. See, e.g., Griffith v. Astrue, 839 F. Supp. 2d 771, 783-85 (D. Del. 
2012). 
120. Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 169 (1990) (“Judges and lawyers live on the slippery 
slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom.”). 
121. See In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 397 F.3d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(mentioning in passing “the unsettled question whether [Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel] decisions are binding precedent”) (citation omitted); see 
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reason to believe that such experiments can be conducted 
without opening Pandora’s Box or exposing the federal courts 
to chaos and uncertainty.122 Remember too that the custom of 
discriminating between appellate courts and trial courts in 
terms of the authority to establish precedent is just that: a 
custom.123 Tradition is important in the law, but unlike 
constitutional commandments, it should yield when a new 




generally Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting 
the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1994). 
122. To digress slightly, some state and federal jurisdictions allow for 
single-judge decisions from their intermediate appellate courts under certain 
limited circumstances, such as in simple, routine matters or, in the federal 
system, in decisions regarding certificates of appealability in habeas cases 
and decisions regarding emergency injunctive relief. See Hodges v. Att’y Gen. 
of Florida, 506 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007) (mentioning such a decision 
in the federal system); State v. Nelson, 807 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 2011) 
(reviewing such a decision in the Nebraska courts); In re Tyler T., 814 N.W.2d 
192 (Wis. 2012) (reviewing such a decision in the Wisconsin courts). 
Currently, such opinions do not constitute binding precedent. See Evans-
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 230 (6th Cir. 2005); State v. 
Chambers, 493 N.W.2d 328, 329 (Neb. 1992) (per curiam); State v. List, 691 
N.W.2d 366, 367 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). Given the close connection between the 
multi-judge decision-making model of appellate courts and their power to 
shape precedent, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, the fact that 
courts of appeals do sometimes operate through single judges insulated from 
their colleagues’ approval or disapproval supplies yet another reason why the 
present division of precedential power merits reexamination. For similar 
reasons, it might also be worth reconsidering whether such single-judge 
opinions should be given precedential effect. 
123. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of 
Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 518 (2000) (“For reasons that are hard to 
identify (and that are virtually impossible to tie to the Constitution), the 
federal district courts regard their own precedents as persuasive authority 
only.”) (footnote omitted). Even those scholars who have linked the current 
precedential regime to constitutional provisions do not claim that anything in 
the Constitution requires that district courts possess no power to bind 
themselves. Rather, they focus, in some form or another, on whether the 
Constitution compels lower courts to follow higher courts, i.e., “vertical stare 
decisis.” E.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior 
Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001). 
124. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). 
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V. Application 
 
To test the merits of the proposal, consider its salutary 
effect on the five problems with the Social Security system set 
forth above. Because this Article is focused on the pragmatic 
benefits to this area of law offered by the suggested change, the 
discussion that follows will not examine the various other more 
general advantages that may accrue but which are not 




Precedent fosters consistency.126 It may do so to a greater 
or lesser extent, as, for example, when a lower court either 
explicitly defies binding case law127 or, more commonly, when it 
evades it through flimsy distinctions128 or willful blindness.129 
Still, the basic phenomenon is unquestionable: precedent does 
 
125. For a thoughtful and comprehensive exploration of those 
advantages, see generally id. 
126. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 128 (1997) (“[B]inding appellate precedents foster 
consistency.”); see also David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The 
Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 61, 68-69 (2009) (“There is an inherent human desire for stability 
and continuity in decision-making. Looking to the past for guidance and 
direction is thus inherent in an institutionalized justice system.”) (footnote 
omitted); Martin, supra note 19, at 1 (“Adherence to the ‘rule of law’ entails a 
strong commitment to consistency--a belief that throughout a jurisdiction and 
across time judges and other public officials should treat like cases alike. 
Within American jurisprudence, explicit doctrines of precedent serve as 
important means to that end.”) (footnotes omitted). 
127. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
70-72 (1994) (commenting on the practice of “anticipatory overruling,” where 
district courts decline to follow binding precedent on the grounds that it will 
likely be overruled). 
128. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge 
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 122 n.133 (2010) (“Judges find 
ways to avoid [a binding] holding . . . by distinguishing the facts or 
circumstances and thereby limiting the reach of precedents.”) (citations 
omitted). 
129. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair 
Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 572 (2008) (finding that 
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foster consistency. It stands to reason, therefore, that a regime 
in which published district court opinions acquire precedential 
weight is a regime with greater consistency.130 This is 
especially true in Social Security cases, first because there are 
so many of them at the district courts131 and so few binding 
decisions from the circuit courts132 (and there will thus be a 
new, robust body of precedent on various issues), and second 
because the area of law lends itself to relatively clear rules. For 
although disability appeals are, in some senses, fact-specific,133 
they are also conducive to the formulation of meaningful 
guideposts. That is because they involve both extensive data 
and highly specific legal questions. At what point on an IQ 
scale does mental impairment begin for Social Security 
purposes?134 How many hours must a claimant be able to 
devote to her occupation in order to support a finding that she 
can return to her past relevant work and thus does not deserve 
disability benefits?135 These and similar questions confront 
district courts in Social Security cases routinely.136 
Other questions do not involve the application of legal 
rules to evidence, but instead give rise to even more easily 
applied bright-line rules. What types of procedures can be 
permissibly used to establish that a claimant suffers from a 
 
130. See Mead, supra note 10, at 821-26. 
131. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-
Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 769 
(1983) (“The greatest burden of the growing caseload is probably on the 
federal district courts, which face a flood of . . . social security appeals . . . .”); 
U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District, 
During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2011, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicia
lCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/C03Mar11.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) 
(estimating that roughly 15,000 Social Security cases were filed in district 
court in the last recorded year). 
132. See supra notes 78-81, 89 and accompanying text. 
133. See Wasby, supra note 59, at 87; see also Kusilek v. Barnhart, No. 
04-C-310-C, 2005 WL 567816, at *5 (W.D. Wis. 2005), aff’d, 175 F. App’x 68 
(7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
134. See, e.g., Kliment v. Astrue, 710 F. Supp. 2d 831, 847-48 (N.D. Iowa. 
2010). 
135. See, e.g., Patterson ex rel. Patterson v. Astrue, 664 F. Supp. 2d 525, 
528 (E.D.N.C. 2009). 
136. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 46-47. 
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particular condition?137 What kind of credentials must an 
individual have in order to qualify as a treating physician?138 
Moreover, all such questions, both the bright-line type and the 
evidence-driven type, are especially suited to benefit from an 
influx of precedent. For all involve questions that judicial 
officers, who are, after all, promoted attorneys, are ill-equipped 
to answer. A J.D. does not prepare one to understand the 
nuances of deep vein thrombosis139 or splenectomies.140 Once 
one judge has done the laborious work of digesting such 
complex and non-legal information, it is best for everyone if her 
answer binds the others, lest they all have to replicate the 
extensive undertaking. 
One objection that might be raised to the proposal is one 
grounded in a legal realist-style cynicism. Why, such an 
objector might ask, would we expect a judge under such a 
regime to bend to the views of his peers, when he might just as 
easily come up with fanciful distinctions to justify contrary 
results? Surely, a judge apt to reverse nearly a hundred 
percent of ALJ decisions141 can find a flaw in the proceedings 
below, no matter how much case law there may be. Indeed, a 
judge apt to affirm nearly a hundred percent142 can simply 
recite the deferential standard of review143 and find a reason to 
withhold benefits. 
It is not a trifling concern, particularly in the Social 
Security context, where voluminous and highly technical 
medical records,144 in concert with torturous administrative 
 
137. See, e.g., Cruz ex rel. Vega v. Barnhart, No. 04 Civ.9794(DLC), 2005 
WL 2010152, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005) (evaluating the reliability of the 
Stanford-Binet test as a method for ascertaining a Social Security claimant’s 
IQ). 
138. See, e.g., Sherman ex rel. CES v. Astrue, No. CV-10-0343-JPH, 2012 
WL 588810, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2012). 
139. See, e.g., Tate v. Astrue, 853 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (W.D. Mo. 2012). 
140. See, e.g., Sanchez-Wentz v. Barnhart, 216 F. Supp. 2d 967, 971 (D. 
Neb. 2002). 
141. See supra Part III.A.2. 
142. See id. 
143. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
144. See Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 848 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (E.D. 
Mich. 2011) (noting “the voluminous medical records” in a Social Security 
appeal); Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic 
Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 135, 160 (2009) 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
  
64 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
histories,145 allow a creative and persistent judge to generally 
be able to find some facts to pin his hat on, regardless of the 
desired outcome. Two responses should placate the critic. First, 
consistency will come not only from the expansive growth of 
case law, but also from the fear of being overruled by one’s 
colleagues. After their opinions begin to take on precedential 
weight, district courts will be forced to employ their en banc 
procedures more often. This is so because a judge who 
adamantly disagrees with the ruling of a peer will have greater 
incentives to seek the nullification of that ruling, rather than 
simply evading it, knowing that it binds not only him but 
everyone else in the district.146 
Second, consistency is a spectrum, not a black-and-white 
proposition.147 That the proposal would not engender one 
hundred percent uniformity across a district is not a fatal flaw, 
but simply a fact of life and of the law, in any context. Without 
doubt, some judges will draw tenuous distinctions to escape the 
holdings of some decisions, as they do in all areas of law.148 Just 
as surely, though, some——hopefully most——judges will 
follow the new precedents. Perhaps more importantly, no judge 
will simply decline to observe a bright line drawn in a binding 
decision. Even a judge intent on distinguishing a case has no 
choice but to comply with its unambiguous rules of law, and 
will instead have to work with its more flexible components. To 
return to a previous example, the courts might establish a 
range of IQ scores that help substantiate a finding of mental 
 
(remarking on “large social security files with medical records”). 
145. See, e.g., Setian v. Callahan, 973 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(referring to “the tortured procedural history” of a Social Security action). 
146. Cf. Mead, supra note 10, at 809-10 (“A natural complement to a 
strong stare decisis policy is an en banc procedure that would allow all judges 
of the court to announce the entire court’s position on an issue[,]” which 
would “also provide[] a ‘credible threat’ to reverse a decision that strays from 
the law of the district.”) (footnotes omitted). 
147. See Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of 
Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 
563, 604-05 (2010) (evaluating consistency along a spectrum). 
148. See, e.g., Milton Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: 
An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term—1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 981 
(1977) (noting an area of law in which “[t]he lower courts had . . . been 
compelled to indulge in tenuous distinctions to avoid [the] harsh 
requirements” of a binding precedent) (footnotes omitted). 
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impairment, while inviting consideration of other facts as 
well.149 A judge determined to find disability could not ignore 
that range, but he could point to other factors cutting in favor 
of his desired conclusion, such as illiteracy.150 Future courts 
might then clarify the standards for what tests are permissible 
to measure illiteracy, what scores on those tests tend to 
establish the condition, and so forth.151 In this way, the issues 
open to manipulation shrink over time, the parties have easily-
discernible guideposts around which they can construct their 
arguments, and consistency grows slowly but surely over time. 
Concededly, some issues will always be resistant to bright-
line rules, no matter how much binding precedent exists. A 
prominent example is the sufficiency of the ALJ’s evaluation of 
the credibility of the claimant’s account of his impairments, an 
important issue in many Social Security cases and an 
especially important one with respect to particular ailments, 
such as chronic pain.152 Decisions on such issues will always 
struggle against uniformity, as credibility is a deeply subjective 
concept that does not lend itself to universal principles.153 
Again, there are types of issues in almost every area of law that 
will remain hostile to uniformity. Indeed, credibility 
determinations must be made by adjudicators in any number of 
situations.154 Inevitable inconsistency in one area does not 




149. Cf. Justice v. Barnhart, 431 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (W.D. Va. 2006) 
(“Low IQ can support a finding of manifestation of deficits in adaptive 
functioning before age 22 but it does [not] conclusively establish it.”). 
150. Id. 
151. See, e.g., Campbell v. Astrue, 713 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 
2010) (elaborating on what constitutes illiteracy for Social Security purposes). 
152. See, e.g., Kokal v. Massanari, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 
2001). 
153. See James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the 
New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 113 (2000) (characterizing 
credibility as “a highly subjective concept”). 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Merlino, 523 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D. Mass. 
2007) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claims often involve 
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B. Appellate Guidance 
 
It requires no extensive analysis to demonstrate how the 
proposal made here would remedy the dearth of appellate 
guidance in Social Security law. Simply put, it would create a 
robust new body of appellate precedent in an area that now 
sorely lacks it. As noted, district courts generate a substantial 
majority of opinions on Social Security benefits appeals,155 and 
the federal courts of appeals produce, in comparative terms, a 
paltry few number of published decisions on the subject.156 To 
endow reported district court decisions with the power of 
binding law would, therefore, go a long way toward filling the 
gap. 
As an aside, it should be noted that circuit courts will, of 
course, retain their authority to shape Social Security 
jurisprudence as they see fit, a power they enjoy in every area 
of law. Thus there would be no grounds to worry, as there 
might otherwise be, that the district courts would produce a 
discordant or inconsistent body of cases. Quite to the contrary, 
the circuit courts would likely benefit from the exchanges and 
disagreements between the district courts over doctrine, much 
as the U.S. Supreme Court benefits from dialogue and debate 
between the circuits.157 
It could be argued that circuit courts already reap the 
benefits of such dialogue, as district court judges of course 
routinely disagree with one another as to the proper 
application of circuit court precedent,158 or as to the 
appropriate resolution of an issue of first impression.159 But it 
is a different thing for district court opinions to temporarily 
diverge within a framework where each district court judge 
 
155. See generally Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 7. 
156. See supra notes 78-81, 89 and accompanying text. 
157. Cf. Mead, supra note 10, at 825 (noting that “the Supreme Court 
benefits from having a split of authority among circuit courts”). 
158. See, e.g., Vestax Sec. Corp. v. Desmond, 919 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting such a disagreement). 
159. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, No. 3-11-0223, 2011 WL 
2489995, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 22, 2011) (disagreeing with a decision from 
a fellow judge in the same district on an issue the circuit had not yet 
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speaks for himself, as opposed to a framework where the first 
judge binds the district court and the district court then 
diverges from its sister courts. It is the difference between 
disorganized dissension and organized dissension. The current 
state of affairs in the district courts can be analogized to a 
crowded cocktail party full of intellectuals from disparate 
schools of thought. They disagree with one another, but they do 
so in a loud, cacophonous, chaotic environment. If district court 
opinions bound the district, however, the situation would 
become more akin to a formal academic conference, at which 
each presenter stakes out a position, explains it fully, and 
defends that position against its critics. The battle lines are 
clearly drawn, and the higher authority can survey each point 
of view to assess its strengths and weaknesses, its practical 
implications, and its role to play, if any, in the future 
development of the law.160 
These benefits would be especially helpful to the world of 
Social Security law, because that world constitutes a self-
contained, complex system of interrelated rules that must be 
applied to an infinite variety of often highly technical facts.161 
Federal judges, lacking in medical or scientific training and not 
immersed in the unique administrative universe of the Social 
Security Administration, are peculiarly in need of outside 
opinions, be it from the lawyers, the ALJ, or the witnesses who 
testified at the administrative hearing. When those outside 
opinions come only from parties invested, in some form or 
another, in the case at bar, as they currently do, the judicial 
 
160. See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate 
Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 331-32 (1998) 
(defending the advantages that come from “percolation,” whereby the 
Supreme Court refrains from granting certiorari on a question “until several 
circuit courts have considered” it, so that arguments and opinions become 
better developed before the court enters the arena); see also Martin, supra 
note 19, at 37 (“Including trial opinions in the pool of available 
precedent . . . affords appellate courts a broader view of individual appeals by 
enabling them to see how trial courts collectively have dealt with vexing 
issues.”). 
161. See, e.g., Barbara A. Sheehy, An Analysis of the Honorable Richard 
A. Posner’s Social Security Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 103, 116 (2001) (“Without a 
doubt, social security cases seem unappealing because they are overly 
technical or unduly complex and involve an unbelievable bureaucratic 
maze.”) (footnote omitted). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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analysis suffers from an absence of more generalized, objective, 
legal reasoning. The lawyers are advocating for their clients, 
the ALJ is concerned only with the claim before him and is 
likely overworked and hasty,162 and the witnesses typically 
have no legal background.163 A federal judge operating under 
such conditions drafts his opinion in something of a vacuum. 
He would benefit enormously from the clear lines drawn by a 
large body of binding case law, which would direct and 
illuminate his inquiry in an otherwise cloudy and esoteric area 
of law. 
Another, perhaps simpler point warrants mention on this 
question. Much as the Supreme Court is far more likely to 
grant review of cases that have divided the circuits,164 circuit 
courts themselves can be reasonably expected to devote more 
care and attention to resolving issues upon which the district 
courts are in conflict.165 In a world in which such conflicts are 
explicit and fully developed, thereby engendering the judicial 
and scholarly notice currently reserved for circuit court 
splits,166 circuit courts would hopefully take more notice of 
Social Security cases and develop and unify the law. As a 
consequence, the proposal put forward here would lead to more 
 
162. See Steven A. Glazer, Toward a Model Code of Judicial Conduct for 
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 337, 348 (2012) (noting 
the Social Security Administration’s “overworked corps of ALJs”). 
163. See Jonathan P. Schneller, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Administration of Tax Expenditures, 90 N.C. L. REV. 719, 778 (2012) 
(describing how disability hearings generally have few witnesses); see also 
Nathaniel O. Hubley, Note, The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s 
Testimony in Social Security Disability Hearings Cannot be Touched, 43 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 353, 355 (2008) (noting that vocational experts, the most important 
witnesses at administrative hearings, have “no training, no supervision, and 
no credential requirements”) (footnote and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
164. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some 
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1643, 1721 n.445 (2000) (“Conflict between circuits is probably the single 
most important factor in granting certiorari . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
165. See, e.g., Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 412 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“We are asked on this appeal to resolve a conflict among the 
district courts in our circuit . . . .”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1507 (2011). 
166. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit 
Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2012) 
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appellate guidance both from the district courts and from the 
courts of appeals. Whether there is the possibility of generating 
too much binding precedent in this area is a question that will 
have to wait for another day. Suffice it to say for the time being 
that it would take quite some time for Social Security 
jurisprudence, as undeveloped as it currently is, to become 
excessive. 
An objection that might be raised to the proposal is that it 
would create, if not too much precedent, too many sources of 
precedent. We already have twelve circuit courts,167 which 
lends itself to enough confusion and disarray.168 A critic might 
submit that we do not need ninety-four more jurisdictions 
adding to the din. Two responses are adequate to rebut the 
challenge. First, we do not live in a world of thirteen 
jurisdictions. In addition to the circuit courts, we must reckon 
with the appellate judicial power of fifty state high courts, 
eighty-nine intermediate state appellate courts,169 and (even if 
they may not directly exert their authority over Americans) the 
influence of courts in hundreds of other countries and various 
international tribunals.170 We are already awash in appellate 
 
167. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
constitutes a thirteenth circuit court, in addition to Circuits One through 
Eleven and the D.C. Circuit, but unlike the others, it hears no Social Security 
disability appeals. See, Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security 
Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency 
Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 399, 430 (1989) (“Perhaps the primary reason 
that [the Social Security Administration] favors a uniform administration of 
the social security program is that it is a cheaper and more efficient way to 
operate than to decide claims differently in each of the twelve circuits.”) 
(emphasis added); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the 
Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1126 (1990). 
168. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent 
Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2007) (observing, 
with respect to patent law, that there were “[t]oo many circuits” involved in 
developing the jurisprudence in the past). 
169. Hon. Edwin H. Stern, The 2008 Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub 
Lecture: Frustrations of an Intermediate Appellate Judge (and the Benefits of 
Being One in New Jersey), 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 973 n.14 (2008) (citing the 
Council of Chief Judges of Courts of Appeal, Directory of Judges of State 
Courts of Appeal (2006)). 
170. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and 
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 535 (2005) (summarizing an 
author who “predicts that international courts are likely to exert an 
important influence even as the national courts retain formal 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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law, and the entrance of the district courts will not bring the 
sky down upon us. 
In the Social Security context, the fear of unduly 
splintering precedent by introducing it to the district courts is 
particularly baseless. Though scholarly and judicial discussions 
might suggest otherwise,171 consensus between circuit courts is 
more common than conflict.172 District courts considering Social 
Security appeals are even more likely to defer to this norm, not 
only because they are unaccustomed to setting precedent and 
thus will proceed more gingerly than the sometimes hubristic 
circuit courts, but also because Social Security cases involve 
dense, obscure material, and a judge is considerably more apt 
to welcome a previous judge’s interpretation as a reason to 
follow the same path than as a reason to strike out on his 
own.173 To summarize, ascribing to published district court 
opinions in Social Security cases the power of binding law 
would remedy a troubling absence of appellate guidance, and 




The unfairness of the current regime has already been 
demonstrated: it is the unfairness that results when two people 
in the same location and the same circumstances are treated 
differently.174 It requires no great leap of the imagination to 
understand how the proposal urged here would provide an 
antidote for that unfairness. When a district court judge is 
 
independence . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
171. A search on Westlaw for legal scholarship with “circuit split!” in the 
title yielded 192 hits. 
172. See, e.g., Lance D. Cassak, Hearing the Cries of Prisoners: The 
Third Circuit’s Treatment of Prisoners’ Rights Litigation, 19 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 526, 603 n.377 (1989) (citation omitted). 
173. Cf. Cook ex rel. Cook v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 745 F. 
Supp. 1248, 1256 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (agreeing with and adopting the analysis 
of another district court in a Social Security matter), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 940 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (table). 
174. See Walter v. United States, 969 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Fundamental fairness requires that like cases be treated alike.”) (citing 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-24 (1987)); Alexandra D. Lahav, The 
Case for “Trial by Formula”, 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 617 (2012) (“Fairness 
requires that like cases be treated alike . . . .”). 
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constrained by the previous decisions of the court, he is 
compelled, to some degree at least, to treat like claims alike. 
Indeed, that tendency toward uniformity, though not always 
perfectly realized in practice, is one of the chief virtues of the 
common law system.175 The point has been amply made, and 




More can be said about how exactly the proposal 
encourages the predictability of Social Security law, and why 
we should welcome such a change. Beginning with first 
principles, one of the most indispensable fictions upon which 
the American legal system operates is that regular citizens 
stay abreast of the innumerable laws governing their 
conduct.176 It is a fiction that, in many aspects of the modern 
state, borders on the absurd.177 With respect to Social Security 
law in the federal courts, however, it is a fiction that can and 
should be brought closer to reality. There is a large and 
growing corps of representatives specializing in Social Security 
practice.178 Much more so than most areas of law, Social 
 
175. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal 
Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 96 (2012) (“[T]he legitimacy of the common 
law process was grounded in equality, its imperative that like cases be 
treated alike and unlike cases be treated differently.”) (footnote omitted). 
176. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It may well be true that 
in most cases the proposition that the words of the United States Code or the 
Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something of a 
fiction, . . . albeit one required in any system of law . . . .”) (internal citation 
omitted); see also Tahirih V. Lee, Media Products as Law: The Mass Media as 
Enforcers and Sources of Law in China, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437, 455 
(2011) (“In the American paradigm of positive law, with its emphasis on 
transparency and the fiction that its subjects are on notice about what the 
law contains, law is a kind of information.”). 
177. See, e.g., Jessica A. Roth, Alternative Elements, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
170, 176 (2011) (complaining that we live in a country where “the criminal 
law is too big and disorganized for anyone to be able to print it in a single 
volume,” turning “the idea that the average citizen has notice of what the law 
prohibits” into “an untenable fiction”) (footnote omitted). 
178. See Swank, supra note 98, at 520 (estimating that there are 31,000 
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Security appeals frequently implicate highly specific questions 
involving distinct terms or facts, such as the name of a medical 
condition, or an IQ number. Given the expertise of a Social 
Security attorney, and the accessibility and efficiency of 
modern legal search engines, it is not so unreasonable for a 
claimant to expect his lawyer to be able to figure out how 
courts have dealt with similar cases. Under the current system, 
where the vast majority of cases are district court opinions that 
have no binding weight, a lawyer can indeed determine what 
other courts have done, but that determination is of limited 
utility to her client. Will the judge be aware of other district 
court opinions on point? Will he care? Will he agree? The 
lawyer simply cannot answer these questions with any 
confidence. Instead, the best she can offer is an educated guess, 
likely based as much on the temperament of the judge she will 
have to convince as on the cases. 
To illustrate the deficiencies of the current system, 
imagine a claimant——call her Dorothy——suffering from 
Sjögren’s Syndrome, a systemic autoimmune disease179 and a 
relatively common ailment affecting Social Security 
plaintiffs.180 Say Dorothy lives in Kansas City (where else 
would she live?) and unsuccessfully seeks disability benefits 
from the Social Security Administration, by order of a local 
ALJ. Dorothy visits an attorney, and asks whether it would be 
worth it to appeal. Diligently looking into his potential client’s 
question, the attorney searches for controlling law. He finds 
none. Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has 
issued a published decision discussing a Social Security claim 
filed by someone with Sjögren’s. Expanding his search, the 
attorney looks for decisions from the District of Kansas 
involving Social Security claimants suffering from Sjögren’s. 
He finds two published opinions.181 The first is by Chief Judge 
Vratil, who reversed and remanded for further proceedings, 
 
179. See SJÖGREN’S SYNDROME FOUNDATION, http://www.sjogrens.org 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013), for a fuller description of Sjögren’s. 
180. A search on Westlaw among all federal cases for “Social Security” & 
Sjögren’s came up with 118 hits. See supra note 54 (referring to the currency 
of search results). 
181. Harkins v. Barnhart, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D. Kan. 2005); Busby v. 
Barnhart, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D. Kan. 2004). 
43
  
2014] SOCIAL INSECURITY 73 
thus handing the plaintiff a victory.182 The second is by Judge 
Lungstrum, who affirmed the denial of benefits, thus handing 
the plaintiff a defeat.183 Both judges are still in the Kansas City 
courthouse, but so is another. Will Chief Judge Vratil get the 
case? Will she follow her previous decision? Will Judge 
Lungstrum get it? Will he follow his previous decision? Will 
Judge Murguia get it? Will he follow Chief Judge Vratil? Judge 
Lungstrum? Neither? A world of uncertainty awaits the 
attorney and Dorothy; the former cannot offer much in the way 
of intelligent counsel, and the latter cannot make much of an 
informed decision. 
Now place the attorney and Dorothy in the legal 
environment hypothesized by this Article. The absence of case 
law from the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit is tolerable, 
because the two published decisions from the District of 
Kansas must be followed. It does not matter which judge gets 
the assignment, she will have to apply the settled law. The 
attorney can carefully read and parse the two decisions, and 
can explain to Dorothy how they weigh on her potential action 
and its likely fate. Dorothy can make up her mind in light of 
that advice. 
Obviously this is a greatly oversimplified hypothetical, not 
least because the fact that two individuals suffer from the same 
condition does not necessarily mean that either case, let alone 
both, will be applicable to the case of a third individual with 
the disease. No matter. Though somewhat crude, the example 
underscores a true and important fact: the absence of any 
meaningful predictability in this area, an absence that can 




The benefits in efficiency that would be garnered from the 
proposal under consideration should already be clear. To see 
them, one might return to Dorothy and her Sjögren’s-based 
claim. As it stands at present, Dorothy’s decision whether or 
not to file an appeal in federal court hinges on a highly 
 
182. Harkins, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 1163. 
183. Busby, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-31. 
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
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speculative exercise, because there is no binding precedent on 
point and her lawyer has no firm idea as to how much weight, 
if any, the judge will give to the published district court cases 
discussing her condition. The decision to pursue satisfaction in 
court, with its associated costs in time and money to the 
claimant, his attorney, and the executive and judicial branches, 
should not rest on so tenuous a ground. In contrast, if those 
district court cases carry the force of law, Dorothy will be far 
better-equipped to intelligently deliberate over her choice. If 
she has a decent shot, she will press forward for the benefits 
she arguably deserves; if she does not, she can save everyone 
the energy and expense. An enormous backlog of cases is 




We dwell in a vast, and vastly complex, administrative 
state, in which many problems require equally complex 
solutions that take into account the interconnections between 
myriad finely-tuned components.184 Other problems are less 
formidable, and they should be tackled in a more 
straightforward fashion. A prime example is the inconsistency 
between federal district court judges in the resolution of Social 
Security appeals. It is a simple problem, but one with sweeping 
and deleterious consequences for the fairness, efficiency, and 
efficacy of one of the country’s most important programs. And 
it has an equally simple solution: make published district court 
decisions in Social Security appeals binding law on all judges 
within the district. Unlike many administrative reforms, this 
one would necessitate no rancorous legislative debate, no 
interminable implementation process, and no expensive 
expansions of staff, services, etc.185 All it would take would be a 
 
184. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the 
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism 
and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) (exploring the 
complicated relationship between law and society in the current 
administrative environment). 
185. See generally the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), for an example of administrative change that carried with it 
all of these ills, each likely necessary given the complexity of the area and the 
breadth of the reforms. 
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decision by the courts themselves to imbue their own decisions 
with more authority.186 Given the many daunting issues facing 
federal entitlement programs,187 such a modest and 
commonsense step does not seem too much to ask. 
 
186. Interesting questions could be raised about just what entities might 
legally order this change. It seems beyond dispute that the circuit courts or 
U.S. Supreme Court would be authorized to, given their supervisory powers 
over the district courts. Cf. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 
415, 430 n.10 (1996) (“If there is a federal district court standard, it must 
come from the Court of Appeals, not from the over 40 district court judges in 
the Southern District of New York, each of whom sits alone and renders 
decisions not binding on the others.”). If the higher courts can withhold the 
force of binding law to district court decisions, surely they can grant that 
force as well. It is more open to debate whether the district courts themselves 
could, consistent with their role in the judicial hierarchy, begin treating their 
own opinions as precedential without instruction from the courts of appeals, 
though it would likely become a moot point, as the circuit courts would no 
doubt review that alteration on appeal eventually. Other challenges could be 
raised to an act of Congress that purported to alter the status of district court 
opinions, presumably on separation of powers grounds. See Nash & Pardo, 
supra note 12, at 1750-51 (“Commentators debate whether Congress can 
statutorily alter or abrogate the traditional rules of stare decisis, as well as 
the normative question of whether it should.”) (footnote omitted). Since this 
Article explores only the benefits of the proposed change, it will leave to other 
commentators the task of spelling out the legitimate mechanisms for bringing 
about that change. 
187. See, e.g., Robert E. Moffit, Expanding Choice Through Defined 
Contributions: Overcoming a Non-Participatory Health Care Economy, 40 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 558, 562 (2012) (lamenting the “huge and financially troubled 
federal entitlement programs”). 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/2
